The article compares the role of tripartism during and after democratic transitions in Spain and Poland. In both countries, it emerged after a negotiated transition from dictatorship, but it was poorly institutionalised. While it fell short of 'neocorporatist' levels of governance, it had a 'foundational' function in stabilising both political and economic transitions, and despite its limitations, it endured for decades in the frequent, if unregular, practice of negotiating 'social pacts'. The comparison reveals some striking similarities despite the contrasting economic systems of origin, and identifies some structural constants in the evolution of postdemocratic tripartism, up to the recent crisis.
Introduction
Tripartism has historically emerged as a response to social crisis, and in particular at times of democratic change: its main international expression and promoter, the International Labour Office (later Organization) was created in 1919 in the aftermath of World War I and revolutions in Russia, Germany and Hungary, at a time of conflictridden establishment of democracies in a number of European countries. Tripartism is intended here to mean any 'system of co-operation in economic and industrial policy between government and the peak organisations representing the two sides of industry'.
1 This is often associated with corporatism as a model of governance that, in government and participating associations) rather than 'instrumental' (socio-economic outcomes) functions. 5 In particular, we compare two cases of tripartism's introduction that differ in terms of economic and class conditions, but display a number of parallelisms in terms of timing around democratic transitions: Spain and Poland. In both countries, tripartism emerged soon after a negotiated transition from dictatorship: in fact, the Polish Round poorly institutionalised. While in both countries it has been widely criticised for falling short of 'neocorporatist' levels of governance, it has been considered to have a 'foundational' function in stabilising both political and economic transition, and despite its limitations, it endured for decades in the frequent, if not regular, practice of negotiating 'social pacts'. 6 Given that it has long survived democratic transition, it is interesting to ask how this specific historic kind of tripartism has changed its functions over time. The parallelisms are all the more interesting because the economic systems of origin were opposed: over time, the two countries have moved in many regards towards forms of semi-peripheral 'embedded neoliberalism', where extensive marketization is partially balanced by product market regulations and political intervention. 7 In other words, the comparison keeps the origins of tripartism (democratic transition followed by European integration) constant, while contrasting the economic system of origin, to identify in what regards the common post-democratisation markets create structural constants in its evolution.
The structure of the article is as follows. A first section explains the meaning of 'post-democratic transition tripartism', with reference to corporatist and democratization theories. The second section explains the rationale of the Spain-Poland comparison as well as its limitations, and describes the sources used for the analysis.
Two sections describe the two cases in depth, distinguishing between the foundational period during and immediately after the transition, and the longer-term implications, until the most recent developments. A comparative section will identify the common traits as well as the differences, and the conclusion will elaborate on the analytical significance of democratic transition for the understanding of tripartism.
The functions of transition tripartism and its institutionalisation
Tripartism has inspired the rich theory of corporatism, which can be defined after
Schmitter as a form of policy formation through systematic concertation between the state and monopolistic, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated associations that are recognised by the state in exchange for observing a certain discipline and control. 8 Tripartism and corporatism do not coincide, though: many tripartite arrangements (e.g. the National Economic Development Council set up in the UK in 1962) fail to perform corporatist governance functions, while some countries (e.g. Germany) have achieved a degree of corporatist governance, in terms of coordinated political exchange between government and associations, without creating formal tripartite institutions. While the theory of corporatism developed for stable political systems, whether democratic or not, tripartism proved particularly popular in transition societies, which almost by definition lack the prerequisites of organisational order and stability for effective corporatism. The long waves of the 'corporatist Sisyphus' that, according to Grote and Schmitter, mark the historical ups and downs of tripartism have a strong association with waves of democratisation, in particular after the two World Wars, in the 1970s and in the 1990s. 9 The numerous cases in which tripartism was introduced during a regime change are at odds with a tenet of corporatist theory, i.e. that corporatism corresponds to a process of differentiation of the political systems, between parliamentary and corporatist organs and between political and socioeconomic functions. 10 Emerging political systems cannot be seen as already functionally differentiating according to functionalist or system theories, for the simple reason that they have not yet had the time for testing which functions require additional organs. It is more likely that in these foundational moments, institutions are created for more specific historical and political reasons, responding to crisis or to actors' interests rather than to institutional development logics.
Schmitter, by combining the study of corporatism with the study of democratisation, observed that corporatism may play a specific function during democratisation. He argued that where class organizations, thanks to strategic capacity and encompassing scope, develop in a 'corporatist' way (as centralized, hierarchically organized and co-opted in policy making), they can play a much more significant role in the consolidation of democracy than where they turn into 'pluralist' organizations, in the sense of fragmented and unco-ordinated. 11 Tripartism can therefore channel and stabilise the frequent protagonism of labour during democratisation. 12 This has been corroborated by studies of Latin American democratic transitions: the ideal mix for the democratic output appeared to be a sequence of high mobilization of labour followed by a capacity to show restraint by workers' organizations.
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The specificity of post-democratic transition tripartism (e.g. in Spain, South Korea, Portugal and South Africa) was not immediately evident in many cases.
However there was a realization that tripartism appeared to be possible even without the Spain and Poland happen to be comparable for other reasons too. Their size is very similar (around 35m inhabitants at the time of the transition), and size is a wellknown factor affecting countries' capacities to develop encompassing organisations and centralised co-ordination. 21 They are also Catholic countries, which is generally associated with pluralist trade unions along political lines, in these two cases two main competing confederations. 22 The economic structure was already broadly similar at the time of transition: a large agriculture sector had dominated until recently, the manufacturing sector had just peaked at nearly 40% of GDP, and a fast process of de-industrialisation was starting, exacerbated by opening to international competition.
Politically, at the beginning of the transition both Spain and Poland were highly centralised states -although in Spain strong centrifugal pressures would soon emerge.
These similarities combine with some striking parallelisms in the timing of tripartite development. In both cases, the transition had been preceded by waves of labour unrest and strikes that, while formally illegal, were hardly controllable by the régime: in the early-mid 1970s in Spain, and in 1980 and 1988 in Poland. In both cases, the peak of tripartism was in the first few years of transition, with a decline -but no disappearance -once democracy was consolidated. And on both sides, the introduction of tripartism coincided with strike waves and was followed by a very rapid fall of industrial unrest. In Spain, the number of strike participants fell from a peak of 3-6m per year in 1976-79 to 1m by 1986, and the number of working days lost in strikes from 11-19m to 2m in the same period. 23 In Poland, the number of strikers fell from 400-800,000
in 1992-93 to only 18,000 by 1995, and the number of days lost from 0.6-2.3m to 60,000 in the same period. 24 Trade union density declined in a strikingly similar manner in the two countries: from around 50% at the time of transition to around 15%, amongst the lowest in Europe, in 2010. The account is split in two parts for each country. First, the foundation period during transition (1976-86 and 1989-95) . Secondly, the subsequent path after First, it was not stable and presented a changing geometry in actor constellation.
An in-depth analysis shows the tensions and internal contradictions behind peak-level negotiations in this period; negotiations were characterised by the asymmetry in the participation of actors, who maintained contradictory views on the use of policy concertation and social pacts in the process of democratic consolidation and economic adjustment, as well as on the substance of the negotiations; social pacts were often bipartite rather than tripartite. 36 Second, the absence of CCOO in many of these pacts reflects a lack of consensus among confederal unionism on the terms and contents of negotiations and more importantly, it reflects different, unstable equilibriums between political and collective bargaining roles of trade unions.
Third, tripartite negotiations were encouraged by all governments, in part due to the political exceptionalism of the transition, but also because of short-term political calculations; the UCD centre executive (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) looked for concertation in order to overcome the weakness of its minority government; the socialist PSOE 37 executive (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) initially relied on it due to fears of strong opposition coming from CEOE, but also from unions (especially CCOO)due to the marked monetarist character of its economic policies. This instrumental role of tripartite negotiations limited the capacity of social partners to autonomously lead the process hence leaving it strongly dependent upon the state. 
Poland

The transition mark
Poland's experience of tripartism is widely dismissed as pure failure and façade. 49 Indeed, there is little evidence of those major, encompassing, comprehensive and institutionalised agreements that have been called 'social pacts' in Western Europe.
However, a deeper and more detailed examination of the interactions between the actors shows that tripartism has performed some function, whether intentional or not.
As argued by Bruszt and Stark, the country-specific modes of transition from communism have had important influences on the later path of Central Eastern
European countries: in the case of Poland, it was a negotiated path. 50 Communist Poland had already experienced some indirect forms of 'arm-length social dialogue' during the reformist periods of Gomułka (1956-58) and Gierek (1971) , but, more frequently, worker protests were violently repressed (1956, 1970, 1976 The unplanned and unexpected acceleration of political changes in Poland, and then in the whole of Eastern Europe, during the summer of 1989 led to major changes in the conception of social dialogue. As Solidarity took over the responsibility of forming a government, the trade union function was immediately demoted: as Lech Wałęsa himself declared, 'we will not catch up with Europe if we create a strong trade union'.
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The union took on the role of 'protective umbrella', as a guarantee of social peace while the government, increasingly dominated by the neo-liberal Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, introduced radical market reforms. Under the label of 'shock therapy', the reforms had very high social costs (unemployment increased from 0% to 16% in two years, while industrial production fell by 35%), and included the elimination of works councils in private companies and regressive income policies (in particular, an unpopular tax on wage increases in state-owned companies). The removal of works councils and the imposition of unilateral income policies undermined the institutional basis for articulated social dialogue at micro and meso levels.
The specific double function of Solidarity means that unlike the other postcommunist countries in the region, Poland initially did not need tripartite institutions:
social dialogue between government and labour occurred within Solidarity (between parliamentary party and trade union), rather than between organisations. The 'Consulting Commission' established by the Round Table to After more political instability, early elections and pressure from a strike in the energy sector, the institutionalisation of tripartism occurred through the establishment of the proposed Tripartite Commission in 1994, under a new government led by the postcommunist SLD. 58 The Tripartite Commission resembles analogous institutions that had already been created in Central European countries following recommendations from the ILO, but it responded to internal needs rather than external influence. 59 Initially, it was proposed that it would have a consultation role, on the model of the Spanish Consejo Económico y Social, but eventually the government opted for an institution with decisional powers, in the hope of sharing with the unions the responsibility for income policies and social reforms. However, with time, a commission for central socio-economic co-ordination proved inconsistent with the broader neoliberal economic policy conducted by subsequent Polish governments, whether conservative or social democratic. 60 Overall, the importance of compromise during the transition -initially between communist government and Solidarity, then within different factions of the Solidarity government, and eventually through formal tripartism -help to explain how a difficult democratic and economic transition could occur successfully, and in particular how neoliberal 'shock therapy' could be 'embedded' and softened through targeted social policies (pensions, unemployment benefits, privatisation mechanisms).
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Consolidation and path dependencies
The most important competence of the Tripartite Commission was to agree yearly wage increases, which would be binding for the state sector and non-binding for the private.
However, the private sector actually paid little or no attention to such recommendations, and pay developments have demonstrated a very substantial wage drift from the tripartite indicators. 62 Only in 1995 and 1996 did the Commission manage to reach an agreement on wage increases for the public sector, while in other years the government was left with the responsibility of taking unilateral decisions. At the same time, collective bargaining failed to emerge in the private sector, and no bilateral coordination on wages occurred, mostly because of refusal from the employer side. Polish tripartism was further promoted by the EU during the accession period, but it kept failing to achieve substantial results.
The role of union politicisation was very clear and is the most frequently proposed explanation of the Polish failures. 63 In 1997, under a left-wing government, Solidarity withdrew from the Commission; in 1998-2001, once Solidarity had come back to power, it was OPZZ which did the same. As the Tripartite Commission set up in 1994 had to take decisions by unanimity, withdrawal from one side all but stalled its operation. In order to overcome this limit, a law was passed in 2001 to institutionalise and reform the Tripartite Commission. Representativeness criteria were introduced, according to which the largest unions Solidarity, OPZZ and FZZ, 64 and the largest employer organisations KPP, PKPP and Business Centre Club were admitted.
Despite the law and despite the efforts by the labour and economy minister Jerzy
Hausner to reach a comprehensive tripartite social pact in 2002-04, the Tripartite Commission did not achieve any major result. 65 The Tripartite Commission was side- consensus on privatisation) was exhausted suggests that it must have performed some functions, rather than being merely illusory. 66 The large number of committees and meetings, involving national leaders but also expert and regional officers, resulted in the establishment of networks of relations among the social partners, in the development of substantial organisational capacities and technical expertise on all sides, and in a process of social learning and trust building. According to several participants, the Commission was a place where, even if formal agreements were not signed, a number of political and work conflicts could be discussed and solved.
The obstacles to a more systematic function of tripartism refer to all three actors.
The most frequently mentioned obstacle, trade union politicisation and polarisation between Solidarity's links with the Right and OPZZ's with the Left, has gradually declined. By 2011, the two main confederations could collaborate in their joint opposition to the liberal government. But exactly at that time, ironically, tripartite dialogue collapsed rather than improved, demonstrating that union politicisation was not the main obstacle in the first place. 67 The government side appealed for social pacts 
Comparative lessons
The two experiences display a number of similarities, which is striking given that western and eastern European social developments are generally seen as hardly comparable (Table 1) . Both Poland and Spain resorted to centralized negotiations during their transitions from dictatorship, and established tripartite dialogue as a generalized common practice; but even if Spain has achieved more substantial results, neither of the two countries turned tripartism into formal, authoritative and articulated institutions. In 2009, Natali and Pochet described Spanish tripartite social pacts as 'fully institutionalised', because they have been signed by both right-wing and left-wing governments. 70 However, such a definition neglects that during extended periods (1986-96 and 2000-04) there were no tripartite agreements, and that Spanish tripartism has failed in most of its socio-economic functions: wage setting has remained disarticulated and employment relations paternalistic or adversarial. Agreements on socio-economic policies have remained contingent on actor interests, with little institutional constraint.
In fact, two years after Natali and Pochet had thought that Spanish tripartism was fully institutionalised, it all but collapsed under the weight of the economic crisis. 71 From a purely formal point of view, tripartism in Spain is less institutionalised than in Poland, because the Consejo Económico y Social was established with more delay than the Polish Tripartite Commission, and unlike the latter, it only has consultative functions. In the end Spanish tripartism accompanied, rather than socio-economic co-ordination, the shift towards a kind of peripheral liberal market economy that has been defined as "Mediterranean neoliberalism". 72 This is not so different from the evolution of Poland from an 'embedded' neoliberalism towards an increasingly deregulated, and equally peripheral one. While in these two cases corporatism receives state support, which according to the literature should be enough for it to survive during economic crisis, 73 the fact that it is now actually seriously struggling suggests that it operates here under a specific form -what we call the post-democratic dimension.
In Spain and Poland tripartism and centralised negotiations were instrumental to the consolidation of democracy, most visibly in the rapid decline of protest and industrial action, and in the marginalisation of extremist parties (the authoritarian Right and the communists). In both countries, at least until the recent European crisis, tripartism has been accepted as a generalised practice and governments are expected to negotiate centrally, and pay a political cost when they do not. The major difference between the two countries is in the development of bipartite relations between employer and labour organisations: Spain has one of the highest collective bargaining coverage levels in the EU (85%), and Poland one of the lowest (29%).
How can one explain the political parallelisms in spite of the differences in employment relations, and the long survival of tripartism despite its weak institutionalisation? We argue that the reason lies exactly in the specific functions and forms of post-democratic transition tripartism. This type of tripartism includes three important features. First, a focus on 'expressive' rather than 'instrumental' functions: in this sense, the 'illusory' aspect of corporatism in these arrangements is intentional, because it is the search for legitimation, rather than the solution of socio-economic coordination problems, that is the main aim. 74 Secondly, and as a direct consequence of the first feature, this kind of tripartism assumes and maintains a high degree of politicisation, most visibly in the trade unions, which enter difficult and sometimes competitive union-party relations (especially in the cases of UGT-PSOE, Solidarity-AWS, 75 and OPZZ-SLD relations). In the public debate of these countries, trade unions are often blamed for their politicisation. But while this feature pre-existed tripartism, it was the role in negotiated transition and the focus on centralised negotiations that cemented it, by focusing the organisations on political and even governmental resources. It is not surprising, therefore, that in this kind of tripartism unions end up paying little attention to member recruitment and look rather to the state for support.
Third, this kind of tripartism is paradoxically very visible in the institutions, in political debates and in the media, but, as already discussed is weakly institutionalised. Its institutionalisation appears impossible because of its contradictory nature: a socioeconomic institution that needs to solve political problems, without however assuming economic co-ordination roles that would derail neoliberalism. The partial functions performed by these institutions (exchanging political legitimation with central resources for the participating organisations) explain why this kind of tripartism may have survived for so long despite both Poland and Spain ranking among the last industrialised countries in terms of corporatism and socio-economic co-ordination.
It is intriguing, and it would deserve further research, that there are some striking similarities also in terms of outcomes. Not only have both Poland and Spain become peripheral neoliberal countries. They also developed deeply segmented economies, with very large micro-company sectors that are basically outside the scope of tripartism, and particular high levels of employment casualization. 76 Given that on both aspects they are significantly worse in both areas than neighbouring countries, it may be hypothesised that post-democratic transition tripartism has specific problems of inclusiveness and that its imbalance towards the central level fails to connect with large sections of economy and society.
The comparison has revealed certain surprising parallels between developments in countries that are usually studied separately. In fact, East-West comparisons are theoretically useful to identify constant structures behind different socio-economic contexts, and to avoid comparing the new market economies with 'ideal types' of market and democracy, rather than the really existing ones. 77 The tripartite features described here are not exclusive to Spain and Poland: the role of politics has been underlined more generally in the recent waves of social pacts. 78 But the degree of tripartism is politicisation does make these two countries stand out from the countries of their own 'varieties of capitalism' or 'industrial relations types'. Within Southern Europe, Spanish tripartism differs from the Italian one (that was developed from the 1980s, at a time of political strains but long after the exit from dictatorship) for its higher formalisation in official, legally sanctioned agreements (the expressive function)
as well as for its poorer articulation on socio-economic issues (instrumental function). This is demonstrated by the higher autonomy and resilience of collective bargaining, particularly during the recent crisis, in Italy than in Spain where, despite the high coverage, the incidence and articulation of collective agreements were more fragile and have been undermined by recent reforms. 79 It also differs, in its higher visibility and longer duration, from the Portuguese and Greek experiences, in which tripartism had not played a foundational role during democratic transition. Similarly, Polish tripartism differs from that of the other Central Eastern European countries for its much higher political visibility, but also lesser regulatory capacity: in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, even if unlike in Poland the protagonists of tripartism are hardly known to the broader public, while centralised agreements have often had substantial effects on wage developments and employment policies.
( Table 1 )
Conclusion
The historical comparison highlights strong parallels in some formal features and functions of tripartism in Poland and Spain, rooted in the democratic transition experience. In both cases, despite the contextual economic differences and distinctively from neighbouring countries, a specific type of tripartism performing important expressive functions, but with a poor record in instrumental functions, has emerged. Its contradictory nature has not prevented it from lasting for decades, within a path dependency clearly marked by the transition's critical junction, and some important 
